river Ohio to the Gulf of Mexico, and, in fact, to the Atlantic Ocean. The military problems involved in this contest were of very great interest and importance. Let us look at them for a moment.

The first thing that strikes one in examining a map of this region is the immense advantage which the control of the rivers,—the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Mississippi,—would give to the North in a campaign of invasion. There are two main objects in any such campaign.

The first, and by far the most important, although by no means always recognized as such, is the defeat and destruction of the organized forces of the enemy. To effect this, the invading army may often have to advance many miles into the hostile territory, and it must be regularly supplied from day to day with provisions for the men and forage for the horses. Immense trains of wagons usually accompany armies to provide the means for meeting these wants. Wherever it is possible, an army advances on the line of a railroad, which is carefully kept in repair, so that the requisite supplies may be forwarded over it quickly and regularly. But transportation by rail is liable to innumerable interruptions. The enemy may, for instance, tear up portions of the track, or

burn bridges. Detachments of the Invading army are always stationed along the line to prevent these occurrences; and the force available for fighting a battle is necessarily by so much diminished. Transportation by water, on the other hand, is liable **to** none of these accidents, when once the command of the watercourse has been secured. Hence the proT>